mirror of
https://github.com/rls-moe/nyx
synced 2024-11-16 22:12:24 +00:00
221 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
221 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
|
// Package nosurf implements an HTTP handler that
|
||
|
// mitigates Cross-Site Request Forgery Attacks.
|
||
|
package nosurf
|
||
|
|
||
|
import (
|
||
|
"errors"
|
||
|
"net/http"
|
||
|
"net/url"
|
||
|
"regexp"
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
const (
|
||
|
// the name of CSRF cookie
|
||
|
CookieName = "csrf_token"
|
||
|
// the name of the form field
|
||
|
FormFieldName = "csrf_token"
|
||
|
// the name of CSRF header
|
||
|
HeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
|
||
|
// the HTTP status code for the default failure handler
|
||
|
FailureCode = 400
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Max-Age in seconds for the default base cookie. 365 days.
|
||
|
MaxAge = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
var safeMethods = []string{"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// reasons for CSRF check failures
|
||
|
var (
|
||
|
ErrNoReferer = errors.New("A secure request contained no Referer or its value was malformed")
|
||
|
ErrBadReferer = errors.New("A secure request's Referer comes from a different Origin" +
|
||
|
" from the request's URL")
|
||
|
ErrBadToken = errors.New("The CSRF token in the cookie doesn't match the one" +
|
||
|
" received in a form/header.")
|
||
|
)
|
||
|
|
||
|
type CSRFHandler struct {
|
||
|
// Handlers that CSRFHandler wraps.
|
||
|
successHandler http.Handler
|
||
|
failureHandler http.Handler
|
||
|
|
||
|
// The base cookie that CSRF cookies will be built upon.
|
||
|
// This should be a better solution of customizing the options
|
||
|
// than a bunch of methods SetCookieExpiration(), etc.
|
||
|
baseCookie http.Cookie
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Slices of paths that are exempt from CSRF checks.
|
||
|
// They can be specified by...
|
||
|
// ...an exact path,
|
||
|
exemptPaths []string
|
||
|
// ...a regexp,
|
||
|
exemptRegexps []*regexp.Regexp
|
||
|
// ...or a glob (as used by path.Match()).
|
||
|
exemptGlobs []string
|
||
|
// ...or a custom matcher function
|
||
|
exemptFunc func(r *http.Request) bool
|
||
|
|
||
|
// All of those will be matched against Request.URL.Path,
|
||
|
// So they should take the leading slash into account
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func defaultFailureHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||
|
http.Error(w, "", FailureCode)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Extracts the "sent" token from the request
|
||
|
// and returns an unmasked version of it
|
||
|
func extractToken(r *http.Request) []byte {
|
||
|
var sentToken string
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Prefer the header over form value
|
||
|
sentToken = r.Header.Get(HeaderName)
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Then POST values
|
||
|
if len(sentToken) == 0 {
|
||
|
sentToken = r.PostFormValue(FormFieldName)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If all else fails, try a multipart value.
|
||
|
// PostFormValue() will already have called ParseMultipartForm()
|
||
|
if len(sentToken) == 0 && r.MultipartForm != nil {
|
||
|
vals := r.MultipartForm.Value[FormFieldName]
|
||
|
if len(vals) != 0 {
|
||
|
sentToken = vals[0]
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return b64decode(sentToken)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Constructs a new CSRFHandler that calls
|
||
|
// the specified handler if the CSRF check succeeds.
|
||
|
func New(handler http.Handler) *CSRFHandler {
|
||
|
baseCookie := http.Cookie{}
|
||
|
baseCookie.MaxAge = MaxAge
|
||
|
|
||
|
csrf := &CSRFHandler{successHandler: handler,
|
||
|
failureHandler: http.HandlerFunc(defaultFailureHandler),
|
||
|
baseCookie: baseCookie,
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return csrf
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// The same as New(), but has an interface return type.
|
||
|
func NewPure(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
||
|
return New(handler)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||
|
r = addNosurfContext(r)
|
||
|
defer ctxClear(r)
|
||
|
w.Header().Add("Vary", "Cookie")
|
||
|
|
||
|
var realToken []byte
|
||
|
|
||
|
tokenCookie, err := r.Cookie(CookieName)
|
||
|
if err == nil {
|
||
|
realToken = b64decode(tokenCookie.Value)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// If the length of the real token isn't what it should be,
|
||
|
// it has either been tampered with,
|
||
|
// or we're migrating onto a new algorithm for generating tokens,
|
||
|
// or it hasn't ever been set so far.
|
||
|
// In any case of those, we should regenerate it.
|
||
|
//
|
||
|
// As a consequence, CSRF check will fail when comparing the tokens later on,
|
||
|
// so we don't have to fail it just yet.
|
||
|
if len(realToken) != tokenLength {
|
||
|
h.RegenerateToken(w, r)
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
ctxSetToken(r, realToken)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if sContains(safeMethods, r.Method) || h.IsExempt(r) {
|
||
|
// short-circuit with a success for safe methods
|
||
|
h.handleSuccess(w, r)
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// if the request is secure, we enforce origin check
|
||
|
// for referer to prevent MITM of http->https requests
|
||
|
if r.URL.Scheme == "https" {
|
||
|
referer, err := url.Parse(r.Header.Get("Referer"))
|
||
|
|
||
|
// if we can't parse the referer or it's empty,
|
||
|
// we assume it's not specified
|
||
|
if err != nil || referer.String() == "" {
|
||
|
ctxSetReason(r, ErrNoReferer)
|
||
|
h.handleFailure(w, r)
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// if the referer doesn't share origin with the request URL,
|
||
|
// we have another error for that
|
||
|
if !sameOrigin(referer, r.URL) {
|
||
|
ctxSetReason(r, ErrBadReferer)
|
||
|
h.handleFailure(w, r)
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Finally, we check the token itself.
|
||
|
sentToken := extractToken(r)
|
||
|
|
||
|
if !verifyToken(realToken, sentToken) {
|
||
|
ctxSetReason(r, ErrBadToken)
|
||
|
h.handleFailure(w, r)
|
||
|
return
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Everything else passed, handle the success.
|
||
|
h.handleSuccess(w, r)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// handleSuccess simply calls the successHandler.
|
||
|
// Everything else, like setting a token in the context
|
||
|
// is taken care of by h.ServeHTTP()
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) handleSuccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||
|
h.successHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Same applies here: h.ServeHTTP() sets the failure reason, the token,
|
||
|
// and only then calls handleFailure()
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) handleFailure(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||
|
h.failureHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Generates a new token, sets it on the given request and returns it
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) RegenerateToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) string {
|
||
|
token := generateToken()
|
||
|
h.setTokenCookie(w, r, token)
|
||
|
|
||
|
return Token(r)
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) setTokenCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token []byte) {
|
||
|
// ctxSetToken() does the masking for us
|
||
|
ctxSetToken(r, token)
|
||
|
|
||
|
cookie := h.baseCookie
|
||
|
cookie.Name = CookieName
|
||
|
cookie.Value = b64encode(token)
|
||
|
|
||
|
http.SetCookie(w, &cookie)
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Sets the handler to call in case the CSRF check
|
||
|
// fails. By default it's defaultFailureHandler.
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) SetFailureHandler(handler http.Handler) {
|
||
|
h.failureHandler = handler
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
// Sets the base cookie to use when building a CSRF token cookie
|
||
|
// This way you can specify the Domain, Path, HttpOnly, Secure, etc.
|
||
|
func (h *CSRFHandler) SetBaseCookie(cookie http.Cookie) {
|
||
|
h.baseCookie = cookie
|
||
|
}
|