nyx/vendor/github.com/justinas/nosurf/handler.go

221 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

// Package nosurf implements an HTTP handler that
// mitigates Cross-Site Request Forgery Attacks.
package nosurf
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
)
const (
// the name of CSRF cookie
CookieName = "csrf_token"
// the name of the form field
FormFieldName = "csrf_token"
// the name of CSRF header
HeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
// the HTTP status code for the default failure handler
FailureCode = 400
// Max-Age in seconds for the default base cookie. 365 days.
MaxAge = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
)
var safeMethods = []string{"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"}
// reasons for CSRF check failures
var (
ErrNoReferer = errors.New("A secure request contained no Referer or its value was malformed")
ErrBadReferer = errors.New("A secure request's Referer comes from a different Origin" +
" from the request's URL")
ErrBadToken = errors.New("The CSRF token in the cookie doesn't match the one" +
" received in a form/header.")
)
type CSRFHandler struct {
// Handlers that CSRFHandler wraps.
successHandler http.Handler
failureHandler http.Handler
// The base cookie that CSRF cookies will be built upon.
// This should be a better solution of customizing the options
// than a bunch of methods SetCookieExpiration(), etc.
baseCookie http.Cookie
// Slices of paths that are exempt from CSRF checks.
// They can be specified by...
// ...an exact path,
exemptPaths []string
// ...a regexp,
exemptRegexps []*regexp.Regexp
// ...or a glob (as used by path.Match()).
exemptGlobs []string
// ...or a custom matcher function
exemptFunc func(r *http.Request) bool
// All of those will be matched against Request.URL.Path,
// So they should take the leading slash into account
}
func defaultFailureHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "", FailureCode)
}
// Extracts the "sent" token from the request
// and returns an unmasked version of it
func extractToken(r *http.Request) []byte {
var sentToken string
// Prefer the header over form value
sentToken = r.Header.Get(HeaderName)
// Then POST values
if len(sentToken) == 0 {
sentToken = r.PostFormValue(FormFieldName)
}
// If all else fails, try a multipart value.
// PostFormValue() will already have called ParseMultipartForm()
if len(sentToken) == 0 && r.MultipartForm != nil {
vals := r.MultipartForm.Value[FormFieldName]
if len(vals) != 0 {
sentToken = vals[0]
}
}
return b64decode(sentToken)
}
// Constructs a new CSRFHandler that calls
// the specified handler if the CSRF check succeeds.
func New(handler http.Handler) *CSRFHandler {
baseCookie := http.Cookie{}
baseCookie.MaxAge = MaxAge
csrf := &CSRFHandler{successHandler: handler,
failureHandler: http.HandlerFunc(defaultFailureHandler),
baseCookie: baseCookie,
}
return csrf
}
// The same as New(), but has an interface return type.
func NewPure(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {
return New(handler)
}
func (h *CSRFHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r = addNosurfContext(r)
defer ctxClear(r)
w.Header().Add("Vary", "Cookie")
var realToken []byte
tokenCookie, err := r.Cookie(CookieName)
if err == nil {
realToken = b64decode(tokenCookie.Value)
}
// If the length of the real token isn't what it should be,
// it has either been tampered with,
// or we're migrating onto a new algorithm for generating tokens,
// or it hasn't ever been set so far.
// In any case of those, we should regenerate it.
//
// As a consequence, CSRF check will fail when comparing the tokens later on,
// so we don't have to fail it just yet.
if len(realToken) != tokenLength {
h.RegenerateToken(w, r)
} else {
ctxSetToken(r, realToken)
}
if sContains(safeMethods, r.Method) || h.IsExempt(r) {
// short-circuit with a success for safe methods
h.handleSuccess(w, r)
return
}
// if the request is secure, we enforce origin check
// for referer to prevent MITM of http->https requests
if r.URL.Scheme == "https" {
referer, err := url.Parse(r.Header.Get("Referer"))
// if we can't parse the referer or it's empty,
// we assume it's not specified
if err != nil || referer.String() == "" {
ctxSetReason(r, ErrNoReferer)
h.handleFailure(w, r)
return
}
// if the referer doesn't share origin with the request URL,
// we have another error for that
if !sameOrigin(referer, r.URL) {
ctxSetReason(r, ErrBadReferer)
h.handleFailure(w, r)
return
}
}
// Finally, we check the token itself.
sentToken := extractToken(r)
if !verifyToken(realToken, sentToken) {
ctxSetReason(r, ErrBadToken)
h.handleFailure(w, r)
return
}
// Everything else passed, handle the success.
h.handleSuccess(w, r)
}
// handleSuccess simply calls the successHandler.
// Everything else, like setting a token in the context
// is taken care of by h.ServeHTTP()
func (h *CSRFHandler) handleSuccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.successHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// Same applies here: h.ServeHTTP() sets the failure reason, the token,
// and only then calls handleFailure()
func (h *CSRFHandler) handleFailure(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.failureHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// Generates a new token, sets it on the given request and returns it
func (h *CSRFHandler) RegenerateToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) string {
token := generateToken()
h.setTokenCookie(w, r, token)
return Token(r)
}
func (h *CSRFHandler) setTokenCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token []byte) {
// ctxSetToken() does the masking for us
ctxSetToken(r, token)
cookie := h.baseCookie
cookie.Name = CookieName
cookie.Value = b64encode(token)
http.SetCookie(w, &cookie)
}
// Sets the handler to call in case the CSRF check
// fails. By default it's defaultFailureHandler.
func (h *CSRFHandler) SetFailureHandler(handler http.Handler) {
h.failureHandler = handler
}
// Sets the base cookie to use when building a CSRF token cookie
// This way you can specify the Domain, Path, HttpOnly, Secure, etc.
func (h *CSRFHandler) SetBaseCookie(cookie http.Cookie) {
h.baseCookie = cookie
}